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Africa’s largest trade partner, China, criticised for exchanging resources for 
manufactures, has promised to increase imports and optimise the structure of 
trade with Africa. Using a gravity model of China’s imports for the years 1995-
2009, we explore potential dynamics for this promise, uniquely accounting for 
market economy recognition and Taiwan recognition. The former is associated with 
increased imports, while the latter effect is ambiguous and statistically insignificant. 
Comparison of projected against actual imports across three growth-path-aligned 
economic geography typologies - resource-rich; landlocked and resource-poor; 
coastal and resource-poor – sets out China’s imports trends in an abstract 
framework of African export potential. We find not only ‘under’ importing across a 
majority of resource-poor countries. We also find that current trade policy is the 
least applicable to these comparatively poor exporters’ trade with China. If the 
latter are to serve a broader catalytic role in Africa’s regional industrial 
transformation as compared to the role of coastal and resource poor countries in 
regional economic transformation in Asia and Latin America, China-Africa trade 
and investment policies may need additional thinking. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In 2009 China became Africa’s largest trade partner, a symbolic turning point in 
extra-regional economic relations after centuries of colonial-centric ties. Bilaterally 
China is now the largest export destination of South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa’s 
(SSA) largest economy, and also of Angola, Benin, Congo (Democratic Republic), 
Mauritania, Sudan and Zambia, among others (IMF, 2010). This growing China-
Africa trade relationship is the culmination of changes that gained momentum in 
the mid-1990s.  Our gravity model analysis of China’s imports from Africa between 
1995 and 2009 explores the potential for trade to generate positive development 
opportunities for Africa.  
 
The visit of then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to six African nations in 1996 
marked the shift in focus of China’s relationship with Africa away from politics 
toward economics (Alden, 2007: 15). Change in both China and Africa motivated 
the shift. In 1991, China became a net oil importer, and rapid domestic growth 
prompted China to look for security of energy and other raw material supplies. 
Africa was seen as potential source of still undeveloped resources. In Africa, 
domestic economic and political change was afoot too. Apartheid came to an end 
in South Africa in 1994, while the economies of most of SSA began to perform 
better after 1995 (Arbache and Page, 2007a). In the preceding 20 years nearly all 
countries south of the Sahara saw zero or negative economic growth per capita 
(Radelet, 2010:1).  
 
Absolute trade volumes have risen more than 100-fold since 1990 (Brautigam, 
2010:1), with a 10-fold increase since 2000. The importance of trade however 
differs markedly for China and African economies. The share of China in Africa’s 
trade is now higher than for any region other than the share of China in 
Developing Asia’s total trade (Arora and Vamvakidis, 2010), with China also the 
region’s largest trade partner. China’s trade with SSA however remains less than 
trade with Japan alone: 3.4 per cent of exports of $1.203trn and 4.3 per cent of 
imports of $1.00trn in 2009 (IMF, 2010).  
 
These increases in trade volume and more market-driven ties between China and 
Africa are helping to correct undervaluation of Africa by investors (Wang, 2007). 
They are also helping to generate some of the world’s fastest growth rates (The 
Economist, 2011). At the political level these relations are fostered through 
ministerial-level discussions with African counterparts at the China-instigated 
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Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The first meeting was held in 
late 2000 with the aim to provide a platform to advance economic ties.1  
 
Growth of China-Africa trade is not without controversy. The composition of trade 
flows has raised concerns, including that the exchange of African raw materials for 
Chinese manufactures will hinder the industrialisation ambitions of African 
economies (Giovannetti and San Filippo, 2009; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2007). In 
2006, former South African President Thabo Mbeki warned: "If Africa continues to 
just export raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufactured goods, 
the African continent could be condemned to underdevelopment" (The Namibian, 
2007, accessed 05/10/11).  
 
At the 2006 FOCAC meeting China doubled the number of items that could be 
imported duty-free from Africa’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to 440. Eighty-
eight percent of products on the list have at some point been exported to China. 
The average margin of preference was a 10.4 percent tariff. The estimated overall 
economic benefit, using a simple ‘implicit transfer’ method, is $10mn per annum 
(Minson, 2008). Realising the trade benefits for such change is far from easy. 
There is uncertainty about which products are exempt; many of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s more important products are excluded and China’s phyto-sanitary 
requirements are also presenting a hurdle (Danchi, 2010).  
 
China subsequently further opened its market to poorer African exporters, offering 
zero-tariff treatment for 95 percent of exports from LDCs. In 2010, a zero tariff 
applied to 60 percent of their exported commodities. Since preferences apply only 
to the poorest economies they however have the secondary effect of excluding 
countries such as Kenya and Ghana that are on the threshold of realising a 
manufacturing base (Venables, 2008: 14).  
 
Similarly excluded from trade preferences is South Africa, which believing job 
losses were occurring in its textiles sector due to increasing Chinese imports, in 
2007 imposed quotas on selected lines from China (van Eeden, 2009). Africa has 
struggled to deal with the challenge of China’s trade competitiveness by 2011. 
South African President Zuma asked an audience in 2011: “How do we trade with 
China in a way that benefits us as well?” (Business Day, 2011). Addressing a 
seminar in South Africa to mark the 10th anniversary of FOCAC, then Chinese Vice-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Forum includes countries from not just south of the Sahara that are the focus of this 
study, but excludes countries not observing the One China policy, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, 
the Gambia and Sao and Tome Principe, which do not have diplomatic ties with China.  
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President Xi Jinping committed China to “enlarge the scale of China-Africa trade, 
and optimise the trade structure”. He promised that China would seek 
opportunities to increase its imports.2 China’s 2010 inaugural white paper on 
economic ties between China and Africa, China-Africa Economic and Trade 
Cooperation (PRC State Council, 2010), recognised the need to optimise the level 
and composition of trade.  
 
Multiple factors influence the notion of ‘optimal’ trade, both by level and 
composition. In the field of economic geography trade levels and prospects have 
been linked to endowment level and geographic position. Empirically, ‘over’ and 
‘under’ trading have been estimated using gravity models. First applied empirically 
to international economics by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), the gravity 
model links trade levels to ‘distance’ (costs of trade) and ‘mass’ (GDP, population, 
and so on). Theoretical foundations have since been established (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985, 1989; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Deardorff (1998). 
 
Here we use a gravity model to scope China’s promise to increase the level of 
trade, in this case implicitly and necessarily with reference to China’s own 
international import norms. A global sample better estimates trade potential; it 
aligns China’s trade promise to increase the level of imports toward African 
economic development, recognises the direction of trade flows, and finally avoids 
the effect that an Africa-only sample would largely reflect oil trade. 
 
Variables such as common language and common colony are typically included in 
gravity models, but these are less applicable to China. Instead our gravity model is 
uniquely augmented to include a ‘huaqiao’ (overseas China) variable capturing 
high densities of Chinese outside China proper in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, alongside variables for the recognition of China as a market economy, 
and the recognition of Taiwan. We also remove the East Asian island economies 
that play a leading role in China’s re-export chain from our island dummy variable, 
ensuring the sign presumably is negative for our ‘under’ and ‘over’ estimations of 
African exports to China.  
 
Our results are interpreted to recognise the developmental hurdle that is Africa’s 
uniquely complex economic geography. Africa has “a massive land area divided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 At the China and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Business Forum in 
June 2011, Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Qishan said China will increase imports from 
member states of the SADC to strengthen mutually-beneficial trade. (Trade Africa blog, 
http://www.tradeafricablog.com/2011/06/china-to-increase-imports-from-sadc.html).  
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into 44 countries, with overall a low population density compared with other low-
income regions” (Collier, 2008:3). By the 1990s, only 35 percent of Africa’s 
population was living in coastal, resource-scarce economies compared with 88 
percent for the rest of the developing world, while resource rich economies 
accounted for 30 percent of populations in Africa compared with only 11 percent 
elsewhere (Collier and O’Connell, 2007:2). The most striking difference between 
Africa and other developing regions lies in the proportion of the population living in 
landlocked and resource-scarce countries – this proportion was about 30 percent 
of Africa’s population, against 1 percent elsewhere (Collier, 2008: 5).  
 
As a result, compared with Asia and Latin America over the last half-century where 
coastal and resource-poor economies had led regional industrialization transitions, 
in sub-Saharan Africa these countries have performed poorly (Growth Report, 
2008). This trait is compared both to countries of the same grouping elsewhere 
and also relative to resource-rich and landlocked sub-Saharan African countries 
against the relevant international benchmark.  
 
Our economic modeling and economic geography analysis serve both to give 
quantitative scope to China’s promise to increase its imports from Africa, and to 
better understand the longer-term dynamism of recent trends in China’s trade with 
Africa. Our framework enhances the analysis of contemporary Chinese trade 
patterns while also identifying the potential for African development.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 groups sub-Saharan Africa countries into three economic geography 
typologies. Observers of China’s rising oil imports from Africa may be surprised by 
the classification of former Sudan as resource-poor. Resource rich economies are 
defined as those generating more than 10 percent of GDP from primary 
commodity rents, thus reflecting the productive value of each country’s relative 
land abundance. Our classification follows Collier and O’Connell (2007), who used 
a 10 percent threshold because price volatility may lead some economies to flip 
backwards and forwards across this threshold year-to-year for their sample period 
of 1960-2000.3 No matter the classification of Sudan and Congo DRC, our results 
highlight the scale of the ‘under’ importing from non-resource rich Africa. More 
worryingly is that China and Africa have no policies in place to assist directly 
coastal and resource-poor Africa, despite their recognised development needs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The classification is complicated by the fact that exploitation of land is endogenous to GDP 
itself, as well by the opportunities of non-land GDP. 
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the second section outlines relevant 
previous research; the third section presents the stylistic facts defining 
contemporary China-Africa trade and some of the policy variables affecting that 
relationship; the forth section explains the gravity model and discusses some 
recent relevant gravity papers; the fifth section describes the data sources and the 
estimation technique used for the gravity model in the present paper, while the 
sixth section presents our results; the seventh section discusses the implications 
and limitations of the results, and the eighth section concludes.  
 
 
2. China-Africa Trade: Previous Research  
 
China-Africa trade-related research has distinguished the direct from indirect 
effects of China on African economies. Effects may also be complementary or 
competitive. Jenkins and Edwards (2005) summarise the effects of Asian drivers, 
China and India, on African economies in Table 2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
An example of an indirect effect is that China is driving up demand for resources, 
while its manufactured exports push down prices for would-be competitors 
(Kaplinsky, 2005). Resource rich countries, including Angola, Congo DRC, Guinea 
and Mauritania are winners (Stevens and Kennan, 2005). Mauritius and 
Madagascar in contrast have suffered adverse shifts in both import and export 
prices (Zafar, 2007). An additional indirect effect related to China’s demand for 
some of Africa’s resources are the effects described as Dutch disease, the 
displacement of manufacturing and agricultural activity by resource extraction. 
Bova (2008) estimated 2,000 jobs were lost in Zambia’s horticulture sector owing 
to Dutch Disease. The country’s largest textile mill - built with Chinese aid in the 
1970s – was reputedly closed down due to clothing imports from China (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2007).  
 
Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) used gravity modelling to study direct and 
competitive displacement effects of China’s trade on African trade. The 
displacement effect was significant for textiles, clothing and footwear, with more 
limited impact on light manufactures that used medium-level technology. The 
absence of regional production networks in Africa, they believe, makes a 
	   7	  
replication of East Asia’s ‘flying geese’4 success more difficult. Like Chen et al 
(2006) and Venables (2008), they found that third market trade preferences, in 
the traditional markets of the US and Europe, were important for preserving 
African market access in the face of the competitiveness of third party exporters.  
 
Brautigam (2010) argues China has recognised the role of trade and leveraging 
dynamic comparative advantage in its own development could provide lessons for 
Africa along lines of ‘flying geese’ industrialisation. Where Giovannetti and 
Sanfillippo (2009) undertake an aggregated cross-country study, Brautiguam’s 
cites country-level cases of spillovers through partnerships with Chinese firms, 
within the textiles industry. Broadman (2007) used a gravity model to explore 
China-Africa FDI flows, finding investment from China into Africa complements 
rather than substitutes for bilateral export flow. 
 
Although such papers reveal the longer-term picture may be brighter than current 
trends suggest, cross-country conclusions are inconsistent. For example, fears that 
the competitive effects of China’s manufacturing exports are swamping African 
economies as a whole are unsupported empirically. Exaggeration of such effects, 
Shafaeddin (2004) argues, stem from underestimation of China’s own declining 
cost advantages, and also estimation difficulties arising from the difference in 
structure of labour-intensive production in China and other countries. Similarly, 
calculations of the rank correlation of China’s exports against those of other 
developing country exporters, often reach contradictory conclusions. For example, 
only half of such country-level results of Jenkins and Edwards (2006) agree with 
those of Stevens and Kennan’s (2005).  
 
 
3. China-Africa Trade: Stylistic Facts and Polices  
 
3.1 Stylistic facts 
 
The Heckschler-Ohlin (HO) trade model emphasises the role of dynamic factor 
endowments as the main driver of trade, rather than the static comparative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Akamatsu (1961, 1962) proposeda multi-tiered hierarchical ‘flying geese’ model to explain 
the sequencing of East Asia’s industrial development. The model describes how 
industrialization spreads from developed to developing countries: the initial ‘goose’ (the 
frontier economy) leads the second tier ‘geese’ (developing economies) and these in turn 
are followed by third-tier geese (least developed economies) through a process of gradual 
outsourcing. An alternative version of the model is the Vernon product cycle model. 	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advantage model of Ricardo. Under HO assumptions, countries will export the 
good that uses intensively the factor with which it is most abundantly and cheaply 
endowed and import products that use scarce factors (WTO, 2008: 32). China 
reflects well these predictions, exporting labour-intensive manufactures and 
importing raw material resources.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 about here 
 
The aggregate level of trade between China and Africa has risen significantly in 
recent years. African trade dependencies have also risen (Table 3), highlighting 
the relative growth of trade with China. Export dependency is the ratio of bilateral 
exports sold to one country to total exports. Among the 10 countries in Africa with 
the highest export dependencies with China as listed in Table 3, six are resource 
rich – Mauritania, Angola, Congo Rep., Zambia, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. 
Only Equatorial Guinea among them has lower export dependency with China than 
it did in 1990. Countries with low export dependencies with China include Comoros, 
Seychelles, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Liberia. Among those with 
the highest import dependencies, Sudan, Nigeria and Benin were in the same list 
in 1990. Angola, Congo Republic and Equatorial Guinea rank in the top 10 for each 
of import and export dependency.  
 
Discrepancies in reported bilateral trade data complicate analysis of the trade 
balance. Chinese data show an aggregate surplus to Africa of US$720.8mn in 2009, 
while African data reported to the IMF (2010) shows a deficit of US$10.1b. No 
matter the data used, oil-exporter Angola’s surplus stands out – it accounts for 
more than half of the sub-region’s surplus with China. In 2009, according to 
African data, nine SSA economies ran a trade surplus with China: Angola, Sudan, 
South Africa, Zambia, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Burkina Faso and 
Central African Republic (IMF, 2010). Chinese data also reports a surplus for 
Cameroon and Zimbabwe. Apart from the cotton exporters Burkina Faso and 
Central African Republic, those with a surplus exports of fuels and minerals.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 about here: Composition of China’s imports and exports 
 
Table 4 decomposes China’s trade by commodity grouping, allowing comparison 
between China’s trade with Africa and its trade with the world. The composition of 
China’s exports to Africa is roughly consistent with its exports to the world, while 
imports rather reflect HO-predicted endowment complementarities, with fuels and 
mining imports from Africa greater than China’s global average. Manufactured 
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imports from Africa comprise only 6.02 percent of China’s imports, compared with 
67.14 percent from the rest of the world, and 0.39 percent of China’s total 
manufacturing imports. For comparison it is noted that oil as a percentage of US 
imports from Africa peaked at 63% in 2008 (Standard Bank, 2011). China’s 2010 
whitepaper on economic ties with Africa notes there has been an increase in 
exports of light manufacturers from Africa to China in recent years, and re-iterates 
China’s commitment to enhance such imports (PRC State Council, 2010: 3).  
 
3.2 Policies  
 
The absence of diplomatic relations between two countries may be expected to 
increase the formal costs of trade. For the PRC, the first 30 years after 1949 was a 
period of relative economic autarky during which international relations and trade 
were shaped in part by timing of diplomatic recognition. Trade and aid throughout 
this period served as tools of Beijing’s foreign policy goal to establish its claim as 
the legitimate government of China in place of the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan. 
Among the first countries to recognise Beijing were Guinea and Sudan in 1959, 
followed by Ghana (1960), Congo DRC (1961), Kenya (1963), and Benin and 
Congo Republic (1964). The year of recognition also depended on when the 
particular African state became independent too.  
 
Several countries have switched diplomatic ties, several times, over the decades. 
Only Swaziland, a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union, has consistently 
recognised Taipei. Such shifts in recognition annul previous bilateral Foreign Affairs 
or Ministry of Commerce representations. We hypothesize that a shift to Taipei will 
increases trade policy distance with China, and adversely affects trade flows, while 
recognition of Beijing will shorten effective distance.5  
 
Following Rose (2004), we assume China’s 2001 accession to the WTO will not 
directly or significantly affect trade flows between China and WTO members 
compared with non-members. China’s WTO accession agreement brought together 
more than a dozen bilateral trade agreements from the late 1990s, including 
multilateralisation of a 1999 US-China bilateral agreement to designate China a 
market economy from 2015.  
 
Market economy status is important when firms from non-market economies are 
accused of dumping goods in a market economy, in which case they can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 At present, among Sub-Saharan African countries, The Gambia, Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Burkina Faso maintain relations with Taipei. 
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challenged within the local trade jurisdiction of the market economy (Green, 2004). 
Goods identified as selling at ‘less than fair value’ can be claimed to cause 
‘material injury’ to the industry of the complainant market economy and thus lead 
to the imposition of counter-veiling duties (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002:196). 
Since the burden to disprove a dumping allegation falls on the non-market 
economy, political and bureaucratic whims may put at risk the business of 
exporters from non-market designated economies.6 We assume recognition of 
China as a market economy to be positively associated with bilateral trade flows.  
 
There is an inherent risk here that early recognition of China as a market economy 
is more likely from trade complementary countries. For Africa the pattern is 
inconsistent: among so-classified resource-rich countries, Angola had not 
recognised China within our survey timeframe though Nigeria had; among coastal 
and resource-poor East Africa, Tanzania had not, but Kenya had. That our variable 
is time-variant also allows the capture of potential related trade variation within 
and between groups across time, such that a potential for face-giving first-mover 
advantage is implicitly tested.  
 
In the absence of an official public list of countries that have granted China market 
economy status ahead of the WTO timeframe, we compiled a list from several 
sources, including the Ministry of Commerce’s website, reciprocal African 
government websites and WTO sources, double checking against local newspapers. 
For end-2009 we identified 14 countries that have recognised China as a market 
economy: Nigeria, South Africa and Togo (2003); Central African Republic, Gabon, 
Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zambia (2005), 
and Guinea (2006).  
 
Aside from market economy status, other variables could also be included in our 
framework. China has signed several FTAs in recent years with several different 
countries or regions, including Chile (2006), Pakistan (2006), New Zealand (2008), 
Singapore (2008), Peru (2009), and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(2010). Both recent and small compared to the scale of China’s overall trade, 
these did not demonstrate an impact on China’s import levels within in our gravity 
modeling.  
China has also fostered the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in four 
countries in Africa – Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria (two) and Zambia. Drawing on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A prosecuting country could for example use third country costs as a guide to the costs to make a 
product in the non-market economy.	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Chinese experience of SEZs, these seek to increase the value-added of exports 
and to promote industrial clustering.  Early research questions if these African 
zones can emulate China’s success (Brautigam et al, 2010; Brautigam, 2011). Our 
modeling found no significant relationship between presence of an SEZ and 
exports to China, at this stage.  
 
4. Model, Estimation and Results  
 
4.1 The Model 
Gravity modelling has been applied extensively to research exploring China’s trade. 
Benassy-Quere and Lahreche-Revil (2003) examined the effect of revaluation of 
the Chinese currency, the yuan, on China’s trade. Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong 
(2004) explored the crowding out effects of China’s exports on Asian economies, 
finding that the greatest effect was for consumer goods. Greenaway, Mahabir and 
Milner (2006) found similarly that China displaced greatest the exports of the more 
advanced Asian exporters, an effect which has increased with time. Batra (2004) 
found China to be ‘under-trading’ with India, since which time China has become 
India’s largest trading partner.  
 
Gravity modelling has also been used to explore “natural” levels of China’s bilateral 
trade, imports and exports. Bussiere and Schnatz (2006) found that for China’s 
size and location it is already well integrated into the world economy. Edmonds, La 
Croix and Li (2008) found China had excessive orientation toward foreign trade, 
though this varied between trade partners. They highlighted that China’s trade 
with Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe was higher than expected. For this study we 
focus explicitly on China’s imports, and apply the following model:  
 !!"# =   !! + !!!"!"#!,!!! +   !!!"#!"#!(!!!) +   !!!"#$%&!" + !!!"#$#!" + !!!"#$%$!" + !!!"#$%!"#+ !!!"#$!%! + !!!"#$%&"$##! +   !!"!"#$%&!" + !!!ℎ!"#$"%! +   !!"#! +   !!"#      (1) 
 
Where: 
Mijt = Data on imports reported by China from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.  
GDPijt = GDP in current prices from the World Bank, where ‘c’ as a prefix reflects 
China, World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
distij = Greater circle distance between capital cities, taken from the gravity 
database of the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII). 
popijt = Population of China & exporting countries, where ‘c’ as a prefix reflects 
China, World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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excijt = Units of real local current per RMB, IMF, calculated using International 
Financial Statistics. 
landli:  Dummy variable reflecting whether China and trade partner country j share 
a boundary; source: CEPII.  
contigij: A dummy variable equal to 1 where country i, China and a given trade 
partner, share a common border; source: CEPII. 
islandsallj: A dummy variable equal to 1 where country j is an island; source: 
CEPII.   
huaqiaoj = A dummy variable equal to 1 for countries/territories where a language 
of China or a similar dialect is spoken: Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. 
Zmijt = A vector of additional policy augmentations uniquely associated with trade 
with China as outlined. 
 
Following gravity theory, distance is expected to be negatively associated with 
trade flows, and positively related to import partner income. Since our model 
explores the dynamics of China’s imports from the world, we expect that 
appreciation in China’s exchange rate in relation to each trade partner will be 
positively associated with imports from that country.  
 
China is distinctive in terms of the geography variables of the gravity model. 
Contiguity is generally positively associated with trade flows and roughly of the 
order of about 0.5. For China, however, we expect a negative sign because of the 
distance between contiguous countries that mostly border the inland western 
provinces. China’s centers of economic activity are in contrast clustered along its 
eastern coastline. Similarly, instead of a negative coefficient that is typically 
attached to the island dummy, we expect the island dummy to be positively 
associated with trade flows because China’s trade is large with advanced 
proximate island economies, such as Japan and Taiwan. Only for the 
landlockedness of trade partners do we expect to the usual negative sign. We 
furthermore account for the ‘common language’ element of trade with Singapore, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong with a ‘huaqiao’ (overseas China) dummy variable.  
 
Given the distinctive differences in the economic geography, and our interest in 
applying the results to explore China’s import dynamics and potential with Africa, 
we augment our model as follows:  
 
• Islandij: a dummy variable equal to one for island economies, excluding 
proximate trade partner island economies, including Japan and Taiwan. 
	   13	  
•  Huaqiaoij: a dummy equal to 1 for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore to 
account for shared culture between China and these economies.  
We expect the adjusted island dummy to shift from positive to negative 
accordingly, a result that reflects China’s trade with island economies elsewhere.  
We expect a positive association between the high presence of overseas Chinese 
and trade.  
 
China has put in place several distinctive institutional arrangements that 
potentially impact trade. These include recognition of the One China policy and 
more recently whether a trade partner has recognised China as a market economy. 
Past studies have not sought to take account of these arrangements in modeling 
China’s trade. We have augmented the model to include these variables. We 
expect the failure to recognise the One China policy will add ‘distance’ between 
economies and thus reduce trade, since this disallows bilateral diplomatic 
representation. In contrast, recognition of market economy status ahead of the 
2015 deadline agreed among WTO member countries should signal closer working 
trade relations and be positively associated with trade. From (1), our Z vector is 
comprised of the following: 
 
• OneChinaijt: a dummy equal to 1 for the years that a country did not 
observed the One China Policy; source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan. 
•  Marketijt: a dummy equal to 1 for the years that a country has given China 
market economy status; source: Ministry of Commerce of China, and trade 
partner trade ministries. 
Our final augmented model thus is: !!"# =   !! + !!!"!"#!,(!!!) +   !!!"#!"#!(!!!) +   !!!"#$%&!" + !!!"#$#!" + !!!"#$%$!" + !!!"#$%!"#+ !!!"#$!%! + !!!"#$!"! +   !!"!"#$%&!" + !!!ℎ!"#$"%! + !!"!"#$ℎ!"#!"+ !!!!"#$%&!"#   +   !!"#      (2) 
 
4.2 Estimation  
Our sample comprises data covering 1995-2009 for 155 countries, allowing the 
results to reflect a broader internationalised concept of trade potential in terms of 
exports to China. A sample comprised only of Africa would less effectively capture 
import potential and be biased by the dominance of oil and minerals exports of 
present imports from Africa by China. The Democratic Republic of Korea and 
Myanmar, two contiguous countries with close ties to China, were excluded 
because of inadequate data, as was the Chinese Special Administrative region of 
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Macao. Similarly, Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Zimbabwe were 
also dropped. The lack of disaggregated trade data for members of the Southern 
Africa Customs Union led to exclusion of Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Botswana, which bias results for the One China policy variable since Swaziland is a 
long-term supporter of Taiwan. We used trade data from the IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics database. The data for our independent variables was mainly from 
the World Bank World Development Indicators database, supplemented with data 
from the CEPII gravity dataset. 
 
Empirically, heteroskedasticity and the presence of zero trade flows influence the 
estimation of gravity models. Heteroskedasticity is encountered because the 
income elasticity of trade is different at different income levels and between 
goods; at higher income levels trade-related infrastructure and administration is 
more efficient; and data quality itself is correlated with national wealth. The error 
term of a gravity model is thus frequently non-homoskedastic, which result in 
estimates that are inefficient, even if unbiased.  
 
Zero trade flows are also an issue since unlike gravity trade flows can be zero. The 
scale of China’s trade expansion has reduced the frequency of zero bilateral trade 
flows over time. Some remain, including the small island economies, such as Cape 
Verde. Depending on the origin of a recorded zero trade flow, the result will be to 
produce biased or inconsistent coefficient estimators (Martin and Herath, 2008).  
 
Further, since ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson estimation techniques 
require a log-linearised dependent variable, the researcher confronts the problem 
of non-integer values. Practically, it is common to either drop zero values 
altogether or to add 1 to all values. Hurd (1979) illustrated that in a truncated 
sample heteroskeadisticity can produce large sample biases. Adding 1 reduces the 
consistency of estimators.  
 
Our benchmark results are derived using the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) method, which Silva and Tenereyo (2005) proposed for its strengths in 
addressing heteroskedasticity and for providing a natural way of dealing with a 
zero dependent variable. Unlike a standard Poisson or OLS regression, the PPML 
dependent variable need not be in the logarithmic form. The PPML does not 
require data to follow a Poisson distribution, but only that the conditional mean of 
the variable of interest is correctly specified (Silva and Tenereyo, 2005). PPML 
coefficients are typically lower than those of other techniques, including OLS.  
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Following Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), we include time dummies to capture price 
effects across trade partners that cannot otherwise be consistently de-based. The 
same paper also suggests time dummies to eliminate the effects of omitting the 
term than Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) labeled multilateral resistance. 
Relative price shifts between China and a trade partner are also accounted for 
through use of a real exchange rate variable. We finally reduce potential 
endogeneity issues between trade levels and GDP by using lagged rather than 
current GDP. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
A summary of our PPML results for the augmented model is presented in Table 5. 
These results broadly confirm our hypotheses. They show: 
• Partner GDP is positively associated with China’s import levels but less than 
in a typical gravity result; the effect of China’s GDP is negative and less 
significant;  
• The real exchange rate (RMB per unit of foreign currency) between China 
and a trade partner has a limited and insignificant effect on China’s 
imports; 
• Distance reduces import levels;  
• Demand for imports on average rise with trade partner population, while 
the result for China’s population is only significant at the 10 percent 
significance level;  
• Landlockedness is negatively associated with exports to China;  
• China has an atypical tendency to trade with island economies and also 
inversely so in trade with contiguous neighbours;  
• China trades more highly with those sharing similar linguistic orientation.  
For our newly explored institutional variables:  
• Recognition of market economy status, ceteris paribus, is associated with 
increased trade flows; 
• The effect of non-recognition of the One China policy appears to have a 
negative effect on trade but this effect is not further explored herein. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 OLS and PPML benchmark results ABOUT HERE 
 
These findings tell us that China’s trade broadly agrees with the predicted trends 
in standard gravity model: trade rises with partner GDP, partner population, and 
common linguistic roots. Trade falls with distance. While trade typically falls with 
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island status and rises with a contiguous border, contrarily for China the opposite 
holds, highlighting the country’s unique ‘gravity’ in international trade. The 
clustering of China’s population and economic activity on the eastern coastline, the 
proximity of that coastline to a number of significant island economies and the 
relatively small economic size of most of the neighbouring contiguous economies 
combined with their distance from the developed eastern provinces explains these 
contrary findings.  
 
Steps taken to reduce policy distance, in our study proxied through recognition of 
China as a market economy are associated with an increase in imports. Greater 
institutional policy distance – the non-recognition of the One China policy – is 
significantly associated with imports by China, but the results are inconsistent 
between estimation methodologies. The effect is large and positive under OLS, but 
relatively small and negative using PPML. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Checks 
 
We perform three sensitivity checks. Firstly we adjust the island dummy to 
examine if the result defaults to the more usual negative coefficient estimate when 
the East Asian re-exporting island economies are excluded. Secondly, we explore 
the China-Africa import effect through use of a dummy variable SSA. Finally, we 
use three separate dummies to explore the effects of the different economic 
geographies.  
 
For our island sensitivity check we remove proximate important Chinese trade 
partner island economies including Japan and Taiwan from the island classification. 
The re-run of (2) as expected reverses the sign of earlier coefficient estimate (-
0.516, p=0.000), a result consistent with most gravity model findings. Given our 
interest in trade level projections for countries including Africa’s island economies, 
we adopted this adjustment for all onward estimations.  
 
Re-running newly adjusted equation 2 inclusive of a dummy variable for SSA 
countries produced a negative but insignificant ‘SSA’ effect (-0.192, p=0.394). 
This was the first indication of our overall under-importing hypothesis. The result 
however was not consistent over time.  
 
Time period effects within the sample period were tested through division of the 
sample into two sub-periods, 1995-2001 (t1) and 2002-2009 (t2). The timing 
pivots around China’s WTO ascension in 2001 and the start of its ‘Going Out’ policy 
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that encouraged Chinese firms to invest abroad. In the first period, the SSA 
dummy is negative and significant (-0.994, p=0.00), while in the second period 
the dummy is positive but insignificant (0.019, 0.941). There has been a long-
standing ‘negative Africa dummy’ attached to international growth regressions 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997). These results suggest that for China-Africa trade the 
sign of that dummy is changing, even if not yet statistically significantly.  
 
Given signs of a changing ‘Africa dummy’ and the association of growth patterns 
across and between economic geography typologies we used dummies for each of 
the three typologies to explore the economic geography of China’s imports from 
Africa. Using the entire sample period there is a positive effect for resource rich-
countries, but this is insignificant (0.315, p=0.359). For landlocked and resource-
poor countries, the result is significant and negative (-0.525, p=0.046), and more 
so for coastal and resource-poor countries (-0.767, p=0.002).  
 
Looking at these disaggregated effects across time, in t1 there is a near or above 
unity negative and significant effect across all typologies: resource-rich (-0.805, 
p=0.009); resource-poor and coastal (-1.109, p=0.000); resource-poor and 
landlocked (-1.171, p=0.018). In t2 the resource-rich dummy becomes positive 
but is insignificant (0.599, p=0.107); is significant and less negative for resource-
poor coastal categories (-0.625, p=0.024), and negative but insignificant for 
landlocked resource-poor countries (-0.288, p=0.327). The results suggest that 
coastal-resource poor economies may have benefitted least from China’s increased 
trade with Africa over the period 1995-2009. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE:  	  
Results of analysis over the two mentioned time periods are presented in Table 6. 
Compared to the earlier results, the size of the coefficient attached to China’s 
population is much larger in the second period, but significant only at the 10 
percent level. The effect of real exchange rate on Chinese imports is relatively 
small, and sensitive to change across time. Similarly, the impact of China’s GDP is 
inconsistent, changing in sign and significance.  
 
In terms of our new institutional variables, there is no related time period effect 
for market economy status because recognition of China’s market economy status 
applies only within t2. The OneChina variable changes sign across the period, but 
is now and consistently insignificant, a change from the results presented in Table 
5, and highlighting an opportunity for related and focused research. In light of 
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these results, we adopt the full sample period estimation for our onward 
projections, as follows: 
 !!"# =   22.78 + 0.46!"!"#!,!!! −   2.21!"#!"#!,!!! −   0.82!"#$%&!" + 0.40!"#$#!" + 0.14!"#$%!"# −0.61!"#$!%! + 0.52!"#$%&! −   1.21!"#$%&!" + 1.57ℎ!"#$"%! + 0.35!"#$%&!"# (3) 
 
4.5 Over and Under Exporting 
 
Despite the gravity model being widely used to make trade projections, this was 
not its intended purpose. The following results are thus best understood as relative 
comparisons between and within typologies, rather than absolute measures of the 
appropriate level of trade.  
 
Factors directly affecting the reliability of these estimates include that our sample 
relies on Chinese data alone, rather than data adjusted for bilateral discrepancies, 
which may bias the results. Our sample is global rather than specific to the case of 
Africa, and scale effects may upwardly bias estimates of ‘over-trading’, since the 
model assumes trade to be a linear function of GDP.  But the global sample is 
preferred for two reasons: it better helps to understand Africa’s trade and trade 
potential with China, and secondly it minimises the biases arising from the 
dominance of trade in oil within an African sample.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 shows the weighted under/over-trading ratio according to the three 
typologies adopted. The indirect and inverted lens of economic geography 
highlights the resources-bias of China’s recent rising imports from Africa. The data 
shows China to have been on average ‘under’ importing from all typology 
groupings in 1995. By 2009, when China became Africa’s largest trading partner it 
rather ‘over’ importing from all typologies, on average. When the big four trading 
partners, Angola, Congo DRC, South Africa and former Sudan are excluded 
however, China is on average significantly ‘under’ importing from all but the 
resource-rich group of countries. Specifically, China ‘over’ imports by a factor of 
almost five from the resource-rich typology, even after excluding the largest of 
those exporters, Angola. In contrast, China ‘under’ imports, by on average two-
thirds, with resource-poor economies, whether coastal or landlocked, and similarly 
excluding the outliers of the biggest regional traders with China. 
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4.5-1 Resource-Rich Economies  
Of the 14 countries that are classified as resource rich, Nigeria and Angola are 
among the larger economies. Three are also landlocked: Botswana, Swaziland and 
Zambia (Botswana and Swaziland are excluded for lack of data). None has an 
east-facing port. Over half are LDCs (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Liberia, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Zambia), which qualify them for LDC-related Chinese 
trade preferences. 
 
Eight of the 12 economies in our sample have given China market economy status 
over the sample period, the highest percentage of any typologies, while some of 
those that have not are members of a custom union. Swaziland, a member of 
South African Customs Union, also does not adhere to the One China policy. In 
general, this group has historically not had turbulent relations with China; they 
have also disproportionately been recipients of Chinese infrastructural lending. 
Angola, Sudan and Nigeria comprise three of the four largest recipients of China’s 
SSA infrastructure lending, with recent financing to Sudan and Nigeria equal to 
$1.3bn and $5.4bn respectively (Foster et al, 2009). Loans to countries of this 
typology reflect their qualification for Angola lending terms, which directly links 
loans to the extraction of resources as collateral.  
 
China’s lowest density of ‘under’ exporting with economies in sub-Saharan Africa is 
with countries of the resource-rich typology. Within this category, countries ‘over’ 
exporting by a scalar of at least five are: Congo Republic, Zambia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon Only with the three members of 
West Africa’s Mano River Union – Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone – was China 
still ‘under’-importing by 2009. This contrasts to 1995, when China was ‘under’-
importing from every country in the grouping.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The transformation of China’s trade ties with resource-rich SSA, excluding outlier 
Angola, is demonstrated in Figure 1. China takes more than 30 percent of the 
exports of Congo Rep. and Mauritania, and more than 20 percent of Zambia’s. Not 
all ‘over’ exporting is however associated with a country in Africa having a trade 
surplus: Nigeria ‘over-exports’ and yet has a large trade deficit with China. Among 
the over-exporting resource rich countries, Angola sends to China nearly half of its 
oil-based exports. 
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China is on average over-importing from the resource-rich typology, with the 
exception of the Mano River Union countries. This group’s longer-term 
developmental trajectory is different from the experience of recent high-growth 
stories in Asia and Latin America. As a result commodity cycles and governance 
issues, growth of exports alone in this group has not been so far associated with 
sustained growth and industrial transformation either within or between countries 
across time (Growth Report, 2008). Although the growth in trade is helping to 
transform parts of Africa, generating sustainable economic transformation is a 
challenge. The gravity of China’s African trade promise with resource-rich 
countries may lie in not only continuing to grow the level of trade but in 
optimization of the structure of trade.  
 
4.5-2 Coastal and Resource-Poor 
Coastal resource-poor economies are more diversified than the other typologies. 
Ten of the 17 are LDCs, a smaller proportion than among other typologies. It 
includes the region’s largest economy, South Africa, together with smaller 
economies such as The Gambia. The grouping also includes Africa’s island 
economies, many of which export nothing to China.  
 
Seven of the 17 by 2009 had granted market economy status, and two countries 
did not observe the One China policy. Mauritius is the only economy within this 
typology to play host to a Chinese-supported SEZ. Coastal and island economies, 
which have extensive tourism industries, are most likely to have received 
Approved Tourism Destination status for outbound Chinese tourists from the 
Chinese government. Within our sample period, these countries included South 
Africa (2003); Tanzania (2004); Mauritius (2004); Seychelles (2004); Kenya 
(2004); Cape Verde (2009) and Ghana (2009).  
 
FIGURE 2: Over/Under Trading, Resource-Poor Coastal Economies 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, on average our model finds these countries to significantly 
‘under’-export to China.  Over the sample period however the gap between actual 
and predicted export level has narrowed substantially. By 2009 three economies 
were ‘over’ exporting to China: South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique. Benin’s 
exports had also reached more than half the predicted level by 2009. Recent trade 
between Mozambique and China has grown exceptionally fast, at an average rate 
of 30% (AllAfrica, 2012). Benin’s export levels may be over-estimated as a result 
of it serving as a port for some exports of the landlocked countries to its north. 
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South Africa is an exception. As Africa’s largest economy, China’s largest trade 
partner in Africa, and with China as its largest trading partner, South Africa in 
contrast “over-exports” second only to Angola according to our estimates.  
 
The worst performers, excluded from Figure 2, are the island economies, some of 
which export nothing to China, including Cape Verde and Comoros. Mauritius’s 
industrial exports to China struggle to remain competitive against China’s own 
industries (Zafar, 2007).  
 
The density of ‘under’ trading among this typology is worrying because of the 
long-run implications for development. In particular, such a trade profile means 
these coastal, resource-scarce economies  - with their relative “lack of 
agglomeration economies in labour-intensive manufactures” - require a 
combination of temporary protection from Asian competition in OECD markets and 
“ingenious” growth strategies if they are to become middle-income economies 
(Venables, 2008: 59; Collier, 2008, p. 8). Yet, there is every indication that these 
economies are not sufficiently supported by policies to facilitate the development 
of their trade capacity: no coastal economy plays host to a special economic zone; 
few coastal and resource-poor economies are LDCs, so few benefit from access to 
China’s trade preferences for Africa. Economies of this typology are also the least 
likely to have recognised China as a market economy ahead of WTO requirements. 
 
4.5-3 Landlocked and Resource-poor 
 
Eleven of the 13 economies that Collier and O’Connell (2007) categorised as 
landlocked and resource-poor are LDCs. Lesotho and Zimbabwe are the exceptions, 
but they border South Africa and we lack data for them. According to our survey, 
only four of these nations had granted China market economy status by 2009. 
Among those countries, only Burkina Faso does not observe the One China Policy. 
On the basis that the success of China’s own SEZs was related to their proximity 
to ports, it is surprising that one of the four African SEZs that China has fostered is 
in Ethiopia, a landlocked (and resource-poor) nation.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE: 
 
Excluding Congo DRC and the former Sudan, as illustrated in Figure 3, all countries 
in this group are ‘under’ exporting to China. Congo DRC in contrast exports more 
than seven times the predicted level and former Sudan thirty times the predicted 
level. The definition of resource-rich used by Collier and O’Connell (2007) was 
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derived from their sample period (1960-2000). Thanks to China some newer 
larger-scale resource-exporters, including former Sudan, may not now be 
appropriately classified.  
 
Ethiopia’s exports to China have made the most relative progress against 
predicted levels over the sampled period – rising from less than 1 percent of 
predicted levels in 1995 to becoming a marginal ‘over-exporter’ for the first time in 
2009. All other countries are under-exporting, with some barely reaching a few 
percentage points of the predicted levels. Malawi’s trading relations with China has 
increased relatively rapidly from 2007, a trend that may relate to it ending its 
long-standing recognition of Taipei in that year. Niger’s low export levels are not 
matched by a low import dependency. Rather, among economies south of the 
Sahara, Niger’s import dependency with China is among the highest (see Table 3). 
Burundi is the worst export performer against predicted levels, realising less than 
1 percent of predicted exports in 2009. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
For decades, the diverse economies of SSA have played a peripheral role in 
international trade, with the exception of a few oil exporters and South Africa. 
While aggregate China-Africa trade relations continue to be dominated by oil, 
increased trade in general and the absence of colonial legacy issues point to a 
paradigm shift in economic opportunity for the region. There is the potential for 
China, as a large-scale and major emerging power, to better promote the global 
economic integration of Africa south of the Sahara in a way comparable to the 
effects of Japanese and Western trade and investment on economic integration 
across Asia in second half of the twentieth century. 
 
Despite evidence of a diminishing gap between actual and expected trade flows in 
most countries over our sample period, China’s trade with sub-Saharan Africa 
nonetheless still largely follows the recognisable historical default of North-South 
type trade: the exchange of Chinese manufactures for African commodities. This 
has heighted fears that such trade will diminish non-mineral and non-agricultural 
development opportunities for African economies. Despite China offering trade 
preferences to African LDCs and setting up five sub-Saharan investment zones, 
there is the risk that coastal economies especially will not be able to attain a 
critical manufacturing threshold in the face of competition from China. China’s 
promise to increase its imports from African economies and to optimise the 
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structure of trade may come to naught in the absence of other policies to promote 
development.  
 
Our modelling produced results typical of gravity model for GDP and distance 
variables. We uniquely accounted for the role of island economies in China’s trade 
pattern. We found that steps to reduce policy distance as proxied by recognition of 
market economy status was, as predicted, associated with increased imports. 
Steps to increase general policy distance through non-recognition of the One China 
policy – that is, recognizing Taipei instead of Beijing – were not statistically 
significantly associated with diminished export flows to China. This may reflect 
sampling bias, since relatively few countries recognise Taipei and those that do are 
very small economies, which could bias our results. 
 
Our results estimated the gap between predicted and actual exports to China from 
Africa, roughly quantifying the gravity of China’s trade promise. It was found, as 
hypothesised, that China commonly ‘over’-imported with resource-rich countries, 
but far from uniformly so. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea stand out as ‘under’ 
exporters among resource-rich countries, alongside Cameroon. On the other hand, 
our results find that China near universally ‘under’-imported from resource-poor 
countries, both coastal and landlocked, and especially from island economies. An 
exception is Mozambique, which lies on the Indian Ocean – thus closer to China 
than many African countries – and whose trade with China in recent years has 
expanded dramatically.  
 
China’s support for so far five SEZs in sub-Saharan Africa, in Ethiopia, Mauritius, 
Nigeria (two) and Zambia is intended as a positive step in the direction of more 
advanced exports and related investment. To date, the location of the zones has 
by-passed the needs and potential of Africa’s China-under exporting coastal and 
resource poor economies. Most the countries of this typology also do not qualify 
for China’s LDC trade preferences. And yet these are largely the economies closest 
to the industrial and coastal agglomeration frontier, such Ghana and Kenya. It is 
arguably also these economy types that more closely resemble the trade potential 
of China’s Guangdong and Fujian, which each hosted what went on to become 
booming foreign-invested trade zones.  
 
At this stage trade comprises the major element of exchange between China and 
African economies. China remains a developing economy, but its vastly greater 
scale and level of development positions it to assist African economies with 
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relatively favourable and relevant economic assistance. This could ultimately best 
serve Chinese investor returns too.  
 
Having scoped the potential size of China’s promise to increase exports from Africa 
using gravity modelling, onward exploration of China and Africa trade ties might 
use general equilibrium modeling to explore bilateral trade from an African 
perspective, and also more deeply explore new policy. Policy studies that could 
better identify how China might best assist the coastal and resource-poor 
economies in Africa to improve their exports, especially manufactures, would be 
useful. The link between overseas Chinese workers and immigrants and trade 
flows, especially importation of China’s manufactured goods might also shed useful 
insights.  
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TABLE 1: Geographic Opportunity Typologies, Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Resource rich Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, Zambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Congo 
(Republic), Liberia, Mauritania, Namibia, Botswana, Gabon, 
Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea  
Resource-poor and 
Coastal 
South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Madagascar, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Benin, Somalia, Togo, Eritrea, Gambia, 
The, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Comoros, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Seychelles 
Resource-poor and 
Landlocked  
Ethiopia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Sudan, Uganda, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mali, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Central African Republic ,Lesotho 
Source: Growth Report (2008: 75). 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Trade impacts of Asian drivers on economies in Africa 
 Direct Indirect 
Complementary Growth of export markets 
 
Positive terms of trade  
Shifts 
Competitive  Displacement of local  
production  
Competition in  
third export markets 
       Source: Jenkins and Edwards (2005, p. 6) 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: China-Africa Trade Dependencies (% of Total, 2009) 
Exports %  Imports  % 
Sudan 58.0  Togo 36.58 
DemCongo 46.8  Benin 35.62 
Mauritania 41.1  Sudan 21.87 
Angola 35.6  Gambia 20.45 
Congo Rep. 30.2  Equatorial Guinea 19.97 
Zambia 21.4  Angola 17.37 
Gabon 16.0  Niger 16.32 
Mali 13.2  Nigeria 14.89 
Benin 12.7  Comoros 14.66 
Equatorial Guinea 12.6  Congo Rep. 14.54 
  Source: Author’s own calculations, IMF, International Trade Statistics  
  Note: Export dependency is the ratio of bilateral exports to one country to total exports; 
import dependency is calculated similarly. 
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TABLE 4: Composition of China’s imports and exports, world and Africa, 2009, $bn 
  Exports Imports 
                 World Africa World Africa  
Agricultural products                  40.88               (3.40%) 
1.59  
(3.43%) 
76.62 
(7.62%) 
2.09  
(4.82%) 
Food 35.32 1.48 45.25 0.63 
Raw materials 5.56 0.11 31.37 1.46 
Fuels and mining products 34.33  (2.86%) 
0.85  
(1.83%) 
250.46 
(24.91%) 
37.73 
(87.08%) 
Ores and other minerals 1.86 0.04 88.77 6.36 
Fuels 20.38 0.31 123.96 27.89 
Non-ferrous metals 12.09 0.51 37.72 3.48 
Manufactures 1,124.74 (93.60%) 
43.86 
(94.67%) 
675.17   
(67.14%) 
2.61  
(6.02%) 
Iron and steel 23.66 2.38 26.48 1.04 
Chemicals 62.01 2.69 111.97 0.55 
Other semi-manufactures 89.2 6.08 28.59 0.66 
  Machinery and transport 
equipment            591.13 18.29 408.26     0.26 
Office and telecom equipment 346.45 4.87 214.05 0.2 
Transport equipment 64.75 4.42 51.97 0.01 
Textiles 59.82 5.68 14.94 0.01 
Clothing 107.26 3.09 1.84 0.06 
Other manufactures 191.66 5.65 83.09 0.03 
Total merchandise  1,201.65 46.33 1,005.56 43.33 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2010 (values in brackets reflect % of total). 
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TABLE 5: OLS and PPML benchmark results 
 
Chinam OLS Base (1) PPML Base (1) OLS Aug. (1+Z) PPML Aug. (1+Z) 
Constant 60.101*** 
(4.996) 
16.262* 
(8.584) 
54.723*** 
(5.005) 
22.247** 
(10.057) 
lnGDPlag1 1.126*** 
(0.103) 
0.481*** 
(0.037) 
1.136*** 
(0.101) 
0.478*** 
(0.043) 
lncGDPlag1 -0.863* 
(0.455) 
-1.631* 
(0.894) 
-0.877** 
(0.441) 
-2.283** 
(1.058) 
lnexc -0.552* 
(0.302) 
-0.006 
(0.065) 
-0.353 
(0.293) 
0.109** 
(0.055) 
lndistance -5.854*** 
(0.401) 
-0.846*** 
(0.048) 
-5.314*** 
(0.414) 
-0.705*** 
(0.042) 
lnpop 0.639*** 
(0.141) 
0.243*** 
(0.053) 
0.736*** 
(0.137) 
0.358*** 
(0.051) 
lncpop  -  15.941*** 
(5.588) 
 - 10.750* 
(5.628) 
Landlk -0.528 
(0.483) 
-0.868*** 
(0.165) 
0.510 
(0.472) 
-0.571*** 
(0.152) 
Islandsall 5.309*** 
(0.513) 
0.466*** 
(0.098) 
4.817*** 
(0.500) 
0.408*** 
(0.078) 
Contig -5.855*** 
(0.831)*** 
0.752*** 
(0.179) 
-4.872*** 
(0.822) 
-1.014*** 
(0.180) 
Huaqiao   14.539*** 
(1.580) 
1.642*** 
(0.203) 
Onechina   3.501*** 
(0.539) 
-0.706** 
(0.346) 
Market   0.265 
(0.547) 
0.359*** 
(0.107) 
R2 0.2982 0.734 
 
0.3419 
 
0.651 
 
Observations 2409 2409 2409 2409 
*, **, *** Indicating significance at the <10%, <5% and <1% level.  
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TABLE 6: Augmented Model; Time Period Effects (PPML) 
 
Chinam Full sample (5)        t1 (6) t2 (7) 
Constant 22.780**  
(10.010) 
4.512 
(8.326) 
-5.987 
(7.187) 
lnGDPlag1 0.462*** 
(0.046) 
0.434*** 
(0.055) 
0.510*** 
(0.059) 
lncGDPlag1 -2.207** 
(1.053) 
0.034 
(0.727) 
-1.008** 
(0.474) 
lnexc 0.143** 
(0.069) 
0.290*** 
(0.087) 
0.130 
(0.081) 
lndistance -0.818*** 
(0.043) 
-0.886*** 
(0.062) 
-0.799*** 
(0.050) 
lnpop 0.401*** 
(0.056) 
0.497*** 
(0.087) 
0.319*** 
(0.067) 
lncpop 10.569* 
(5.588) 
11.115 
(13.567) 
75.583** 
(30.175) 
Landlk -0.613*** 
(0.151) 
-1.042*** 
(0.293) 
-0.459*** 
(0.143) 
Island -0.516*** 
(0.146) 
-0.904*** 
(0.259) 
-0.367** 
(0.154) 
Contig -1.207*** 
(0.198) 
-1.197*** 
(0.337) 
-1.038*** 
(0.218) 
Huaqiao 1.565*** 
(0.197) 
1.705*** 
(0.533) 
1.329*** 
(0.236) 
Onechina -0.422 
(0.327) 
0.046 
(0.558) 
-0.359 
(0.409) 
Market 0.349*** 
(0.001) 
-  0.381*** 
(0.125) 
R2 0.642 0.865 0.607 
Observations 2409 1345 1367 
        *, **, *** Indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
 	  	  	  
     Table 7: Over and Under-trading averages by typology group* 
Typology 1995 2009 
Resource-Rich 0.152 13.050 
   Excluding Angola  0.126 4.813 
Resource-Poor & Landlocked 0.029 3.435 
   Excluding former Sudan & Congo DRC 0.012 0.360 
Resource-Poor & Coastal 0.212 3.405 
   Excluding South Africa  0.010 0.337 
Overall  0.141 6.066 
Where <1=under-trading; 1=trading as predicted; >1 over-trading.  	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FIGURE 1: Over/Under Export of Coastal and Resource-Poor Countries 
	  	  	  
 
FIGURE 2: Over/Under Exporter by Resource-Rich Economies to China	  	  
 	  	  
	   34	  
 
 
Figure 3: Over/Under-Trading: Resource-Poor and Landlocked countries 
 
 
 
 
